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Regional Banking Laws: An Analysis of
Constitutionality Under the Commerce Clause
Congress has established a two tier system for regulating bank
holding companies.' The federal portion of this regulatory scheme
includes a provision, the Douglas Amendment, which prohibits the
interstate acquisition of banks by bank holding companies. The
Douglas Amendment, however, has an exception: interstate acqui-
sitions are not prohibited if the state of the acquiree bank has en-
acted legislation specifically authorizing acquisitions.2 Capitalizing
on this exception, at least sixteen states have recently enacted or
are considering enacting regional banking laws. 3
Regional banking laws permit out-of-state bank holding com-
panies to acquire in-state banks only when the out-of-state holding
company is located within a specified region. These statutes gener-
ally require that the acquiring company's home state grant recipro-
cal rights to bank holding companies located within the enacting
state.4 Recently, the constitutionality of these laws has been ques-
tioned under commerce clause, compact clause, and equal protec-
tion clause analyses. 5 To date, such statutes have withstood these
constitutional attacks.
This note specifically focuses on regional banking laws in light
of the restrictions imposed by the commerce clause. Part I dis-
cusses the federal regulation of bank holding companies and the
state statutory provisions for regional banking. Part II evaluates
these regional banking laws under the traditional commerce clause
analyses employed by the United States Supreme Court. Part II
concludes that these regional banking laws violate the commerce
clause. Next, assuming a violation, part III addresses the conten-
tion that the Douglas Amendment is specific congressional authori-
zation for states to enact regional banking laws and therefore
absolves the states of any commerce clause violation. In evaluating
this theory, part III concludes that neither the plain language of the
Douglas Amendment, nor its legislative history, exhibits such con-
gressional authorization. Part IV discusses Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
I See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
2 Section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1846(d) (1982); see note
13 infra and accompanying text.
3 See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
4 See notes 14-21 infra and accompanying text.
5 See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 6 which held that the
Douglas Amendment is congressional authorization for states to
enact regional banking laws. Finally, Part V argues for a reversal of
Northeast because regional banking laws present a number of disad-
vantages which Congress must debate before such statutes are per-
mitted to restructure the nation's financial network.
I. The Statutory Framework
Bank holding company regulation began with the Banking Act
of 1933,7 which required the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System ("Board") to approve all transactions in which a
company sought to own a controlling interest in a member bank.8
Congress, considering the Banking Act of 1933 deficient in its regu-
lation of bank holding companies, enacted the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956 ("BHCA") which still regulates bank holding
companies today.9
The BHCA vests in both the Board and state authorities regu-
latory power over bank holding companies. 10 As originally passed
6 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985). This is the only
federal court of appeals decision in this area.
7 Act ofJune 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C).
8 Id.
9 Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982). Gener-
ally, the BHCA was enacted to achieve two primary goals. First, it was designed to prevent
the undue concentration and control of banking activities in the hands of a few companies.
Second, it was intended to further a congressional policy against the combination of bank-
ing and non-banking enterprises. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955). See also
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 46 (1980); Board of Governors v. First Lincoln-
wood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1978). A desire to prevent anticompetitive effects in the
banking industry was the basis of both goals. See S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3
(1970). See also 447 U.S. at 46.
10 The BHCA also requires bank holding companies to register with the Board, 12
U.S.C. § 1844(a) (1982); and, before acquiring a bank, a bank holding company must ob-
tain prior Board approval, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1982).
Regarding state authority over bank holding companies, § 7 of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1846 (1982), provides that the BHCA "shall not be construed as preventing any State
from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have with
respect to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof." Id. A state may im-
pose restrictions greater than those imposed by the BHCA, but a state may not allow a bank
holding company to act contrary to the BHCA's requirements. S. REP. No. 1095, supra note
9, at 22. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27 (1980), examined the extent of a state's
ability to regulate bank holding companies under § 7 of the BHCA. In Lewis, the Court
held unconstitutional a Florida statute which prohibited an out-of-state bank holding com-
pany from owning or controlling a business within Florida that sells investment advisory
services. 447 U.S. at 31, 49. According to the Court, the statute placed an impermissible
burden upon interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause. Id. at 49.
In examining the extent of state authority under § 7, the Court held that although a
state may impose greater restrictions upon bank holding companies than is required by the
BHCA, the BHCA does not extend new powers to the states that they did not possess
before enactment of the BHCA. Id. at 48-49. Thus, the Court concluded that state legisla-
tion is subject to the limitations imposed by the commerce clause. Id. at 49.
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by the House of Representatives, one of the provisions of the
BHCA completely banned interstate acquisitions of banks.' Dur-
ing the Senate debates, however, Senator Douglas from Illinois
proposed an amendment to this provision.' 2 The amendment cre-
ated an exception to the blanket prohibition by allowing interstate
acquisitions if the laws of the state of the acquiree bank specifically
authorize such acquisitions.' 3
When the Douglas Amendment was adopted, Congress did not
believe that states would immediately authorize acquisitions of
banks by out-of-state bank holding companies.' 4 In fact, states did
not begin to enact such legislation until recently. Beginning with
Massachusetts in 1982, at least sixteen states have now enacted or
are considering enacting regional banking laws.' 5 Generally, these
regional banking laws condition acquisitions on two factors. First,
the acquiring bank holding company must be principally located
within a state specified in the statute.'" Second, the home state of
the bank holding company must grant reciprocal privileges to bank
holding companies principally located within the enacting state.' 7
The Massachusetts statute is illustrative.' 8 Like the standard
II H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 15 (1955).
12 See 102 CONG. REC. 6856-57 (1956).
13 Section 3(d) of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982), (the Douglas Amendment)
provides:
(d) Limitation by State boundaries.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no application (except an
application filed as a result of a transaction authorized under section 1823(f) of
this title) shall be approved under this section which will permit any bank holding
company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting
shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the assets of any additional bank
located outside of the State in which the operations of such bank holding com-
pany's banking subsidiaries were principally conducted onJuly 1, 1966, or the date
on which such company became a bank holding company, whichever is later, un-
less the acquisition of such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-State bank
holding company is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which
such bank is located, by language to that effect and not merely by implication. For
the purposes of this section, the State in which the operations of a bank holding
company's subsidiaries are principally conducted is that State in which total depos-
its of all such banking subsidiaries are largest.
14 Thus, in stating his opposition to the Douglas Amendment, Senator Bricker during
the debate stated that "in effect, [the Douglas Amendment] constitutes an absolute prohibi-
tion against future expansion by bank holding companies." 102 CONG. REC. 6861 (1956)
(statement of Sen. Bricker). Moreover, Senator Douglas stated, in reference to his amend-
ment, that "the immediate practical effect would be to bar the expansion of bank holding
companies across State lines." Id. at 6860 (statement of Sen. Douglas).
15 See note 20 infra.
16 See, e.g., note 18 infra.
17 See, e.g., note 18 infra.
18 Massachusetts' regional banking statute provides in relevant part:
Companies Forbidden to Do Certain Acts without Approval of Board of Bank In-
corporation.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section an out-of-state bank holding
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scheme, the Massachusetts act contains a "reciprocal privileges"
provision; further, the act limits the acquiring company by requir-
ing that its home state be either Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, New
Hampshire, or Rhode Island (i.e., within the New England
region).19
Such regional arrangements, if enacted throughout the coun-
try,20 could restructure the nation's banking system. Thus, the
Board has stated that "[b]oth the increasing number of states con-
sidering such proposals and the progress of the proposed legisla-
tion toward enactment suggest that. . . a system of regional zones
may develop involving major areas of the nation." 21 The discrimi-
natory effect upon states excluded from the regional banking ar-
rangements threatens commerce clause principles.
company, with the prior written approval of the board of bank incorporation, may
establish or acquire. . . ownership or banking institutions of bank holding com-
panies; provided that the laws of the state in which operations of the subsidiary
banks of such out-of-state bank holding company are principally conducted ex-
pressly [authorize] ...the establishment or the acquisition of direct or indirect
ownership or control of. . .companies controlling one or more banks in that
state, by bank holding companies whose banking institutions principally conduct
their operations in the commonwealth. . . . For the purposes of this section, the
term "out-of-state bank holding company" . . . shall include only those compa-
nies which have their principal places of business in one of the states of Connecti-
cut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or Vermont and which are not directly
or indirectly controlled. . . by another corporation which has its principal place of
business in a state other than the commonwealth or one of the states referred to
above ...
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 167A, § 2 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1982).
19 Of the five states included in the Massachusetts arrangement, Connecticut and
Rhode Island have enacted regional banking laws which grant reciprocal rights to Massa-
chusetts. The Connecticut statute is similar to the Massachusetts statute. See 1983 Conn.
Acts 411 (Reg. Sess.). The regional restriction in the Rhode Island statute, which was en-
acted in May 1983, expires onJuly 1, 1986. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 19-30-1 to 19-30-2 (1984).
20 The petition for certiorari in Northeast illustrates the recent growth of regional bank-
ing laws throughout the country. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari 11 n.13, Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct.
776 (1985). In the Northeast, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have enacted
regional banking laws. In the Midwest, Iowa, Iowa S.B. 512, Minnesota, Minn. S.B. 1837,
Missouri, Mo. H.B. 1239, Nebraska, Neb. L.B. 1069, and Wisconsin, Wis. A.B. 800, all con-
sidered such legislation. In the Southeast, Georgia, 1984 Ga. Laws 1467, Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 658.295 (West 1984), Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 287.904 (Baldwin
Supp. 1984), North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-209 to 53-218 (1984), and South Car-
olina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 34-24-10 to 34-24-100 (Law. Co-op. 1984), have all enacted re-
gional banking legislation. Finally, in the West, Arizona, Ariz. H.B. 2117, is considering
such legislation and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-102 (1984), has enacted a regional bank-
ing law. The legislation generally excludes those states which are home to the largest bank
holding companies. Specifically, the legislation excludes California, Illinois, New York, and
Texas. See generally, Simonson, Pringle & Cardwell, Regional Interstate Banking Developments,
10 OKLA. Crrv U. L. REV. 69 (1985); see also Loumiet & Crim, Florida's Regional Reciprocal
Banking Act of 1984, 14 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1984).
21 Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 375-76 (1984).
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II. Regional Banking Laws Under the Commerce Clause
States are enacting regional banking laws "even though there
are serious questions both about the constitutionality of such ar-
rangements and their implications for public policy." 22 Under the
commerce clause, Congress has the power "[t]o regulate commerce
. . . among the several States."23 As a corollary to the powers this
clause gives Congress, the Supreme Court has held that the com-
merce clause also prohibits a state from imposing barriers which
burden interstate commerce. 24
The purposes behind the commerce clause were to establish
and further the creation of a common market among the states, to
prohibit internal trade barriers, and to prevent economic balkaniza-
tion of the Union.25 Court interpretations of the commerce clause
have recognized that the predominant goal of the commerce clause
was to establish a unified national economy. 26
Arguably, because Congress has established a complete prohi-
bition of interstate acquisitions of banks by bank holding compa-
nies unless specifically authorized by statute, the state regional
banking laws which permit such interstate acquisitions (even if only
regionally) may be characterized as actually promoting commerce
rather than restricting it.27 Nevertheless, an examination of the
commerce clause's underlying purposes, preventing economic bal-
kanization and maintaining an undivided federal free trade unit,
discloses the potential for commerce clause violation.
Congress, in creating the absolute prohibition of interstate ac-
quisitions, acted without dividing the "federal free trade unit."
22 Statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Apr. 4, 1984, reprinted in 70 Fed. Res. Bull.
312, 318 (1984).
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24 South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2240 (1984); Lewis v. BT
Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979);
Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell,
424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976); H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-38 (1949);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.(12 How.) 299, 317 (1852).
25 The Supreme Court has held that an underlying purpose of the commerce clause
was to avoid "the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued the relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation."
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 325-26. Moreover, the Court has held that the commerce clause strives
to establish a "federal free trade unit," H. P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 538, which furthers the
notion that "our economic unit is the Nation," id. at 537, and that "the states are not sepa-
rable economic units," id. at 538. See also Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36; Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623-
24; Great Atlantic, 424 U.S. at 370-71; H. P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 531-39; McLeod v. J. E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935);
J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 267-68 (2d ed. 1983).
26 See note 25 supra.
27 See Northeast, 740 F.2d at 208.
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NOTES
Although no interstate acquisitions were allowed, Congress did not
"balkanize" the nation or frustrate the creation of a common mar-
ket. States which have enacted regional banking laws have allowed
interstate acquisitions, and in this sense they may have "promoted"
interstate commerce on a regional level. Regional banking laws,
however, frustrate the predominant goal of the commerce clause
which is the establishment of a unified national economy. Thus, the
effect of regional banking laws is the balkanization of the nation's
banking industry and the creation of internal trade barriers on a
regional basis.2 8 In this sense, regional banking laws create possi-
ble commerce clause violations.
Given this burden on interstate commerce, the Court has tradi-
tionally employed one of two tests for the commerce clause limita-
tion upon the states. 29 On the one hand, the Court has employed a
virtual per se rule of unconstitutionality where "simple economic
protectionism is effected by state legislation."30 On the other hand,
the Court has used a balancing test to uphold narrowly drawn state
legislation which promotes a legitimate state interest in a nondis-
criminatory fashion.31 Under either the virtual per se rule of inva-
lidity or the balancing test, regional banking laws do not pass
constitutional muster.32
The Supreme Court has held statutes virtually per se unconsti-
tutional where states enact legislation with the purpose of economic
protectionism, or where the legislation is patently discriminatory. 33
Under the commerce clause, a state may not use its regulatory
power to protect its citizens from competition. 34 Regional banking
laws, however, result in protecting local banks from competition
with companies which are not principally located in one of the
states included within the regional arrangements; therefore, they
are susceptible to the virtual per se analysis.35
If regional banking laws were not intended to protect local
28 See text accompanying note 113 infra.
29 See Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36.
30 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. See also Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36.
31 See Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36-37; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336; Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Great Atlantic, 424 U.S. at 371-72; Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
32 In addition to commerce clause challenges, regional banking laws have been chal-
lenged under the compact clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, and the equal protection
clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Gover-
nors, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985). See also Note, Regional
Banking Statutes and the Equal Protection Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2025 (1984) (concluding
that regional banking laws result in discrimination among bank holding companies in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause).
33 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. See also Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36.
34 See, e.g., Lewis, 447 U.S. at 44 (citing H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at
538). See also Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925).
35 Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 382 (1984).
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banks, then there would be some relation between the regional ar-
rangement and the natural market area in the region. Such a corre-
lation, however, does not exist. 3 6 Rather, the legislation creates
regions by simply excluding states which are home to the nation's
largest banks.37 For example, the Utah regional banking law cre-
ates a region of eleven states which includes Alaska and Hawaii but
excludes California.3 8 Moreover, the legislative histories of the
Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes suggest the protectionist
purpose of regional banking laws. Massachusetts Senator John A.
Brennan stated: "I just didn't think it would be good for [Massa-
chusetts] if the big money center banks came in here. Our banks
need the space to grow first. "3 9 Further, the Connecticut legislative
history indicates that the legislature intended to give Connecticut
banks time to merge and consolidate with larger banks not located
within the New England region. 40 Thus, regional banking laws
could be virtually per se unconstitutional since they result in simple
economic protectionism of banks located within the enacting
states. 41
Apart from the per se test, in some circumstances the Supreme
Court has balanced the state interest promoted by the state legisla-
tion against the federal interest in unburdened interstate com-
merce. This balancing approach has traditionally been used when a
state statute promotes a legitimate state interest in a nondiscrimina-
tory fashion and the statute is narrowly drawn to achieve that pur-
pose. 42 Accordingly, even if regional banking laws are not a per se
36 S. REP. No. 560, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1984) (additional views of Senator
D'Amato).
37 Principally, California, Illinois, New York, and Texas are excluded. See note 20 supra
and accompanying text.
38 UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-102 (1984); see S. REP. No. 560, supra note 36, at 112 (addi-
tional views of Sen. D'Amato). The regional zone created by the New England arrange-
ment includes Connecticut but excludes New York, 1983 Conn. Acts 411 (Reg. Sess.),
though more Connecticut residents commute to New York than to Massachusetts or Maine,
two states which are included in the arrangement. See S. REP. No. 560, supra note 36, at
110.
39 See Enlivening Banking for Fun and Fireworks, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1983, at F4.
40 The Report to the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut of the Commission
to Study Legislation to Limit the Conduct of Business in Connecticut, January 5, 1983, at
12.
41 See Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 384 (1984) (holding that the
Connecticut regional banking statute is per se unconstitutional).
42 See note 31 supra and accompanying text. The Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970), delineated the nature of the inquiry when employing the balancing
test. The Court stated:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be up-
held unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the ques-
tion becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
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unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, they nonetheless
fail this balancing test because no reasonable relationship exists be-
tween their geographic distinctions and a proper state goal.43
In Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc. ,44 the Court held uncon-
stitutional a Florida statute which overtly prohibited an out-of-state
bank holding company from controlling a Florida investment advi-
sory service. The Court determined that such a restriction imposed
an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the
commerce clause.45 The Court recognized that a state has legiti-
mate interests, with respect to banking, in "discouraging undue
economic concentration in the arena of high finance," 46 in "pro-
tect[ing] local residents from fraud," 47 and in "maximizing local
control over locally based financial activities." 48 The Court held,
however, that the extent of the burden placed on out-of-state bank
holding companies was not justified by these legitimate state inter-
ests. 49 According to the Court, Florida could have promoted these
interests by less discriminatory means. 50
Similarly, states may promote their interests in bank regulation
by less discriminatory means than regional banking laws. Gener-
ally, regional banking laws promote three state interests. First, re-
gional banking laws help to avoid monopolization in the local
banking industry.5 1 Second, these laws tend to assure that the local
banking industry is responsive to local needs.5 2 And finally, re-
gional banking laws help to maintain local control over local
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
43 See Lewis, 447 U.S. at 42.
44 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
45 Id. at 44.




50 Id. The Court stated:
[Florida] has demonstrated no basis for an inference that all out-of-state bank
holding companies are likely to possess the evils of monopoly power, that they are
more likely to do so than their homegrown counterparts, or that they are any more
inclined to engage in sharp practices than bank holding companies that are locally
based. Nor is there any reason to conclude that outright prohibition of entry,
rather than some intermediate form of regulation, is the only effective method of
protecting against the presumed evils, particularly when other out-of-state busi-
nesses that may be just as large or far-flung are permitted to compete in the local
market.
Id. (footnote omitted).
51 The Report to the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut of the Commission
to Study Legislation to Limit the Conduct of Business in Connecticut, January 5, 1983, at 8-
9.
52 Id. at 10.
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banks.53
Despite these stated concerns, nothing suggests that all bank
holding companies located outside a regional banking arrangement
are more likely to cause either economic concentration or greater
difficulties with respect to local control than bank holding compa-
nies located within a regional arrangement. 54 Avoiding monopoli-
zation in the banking industry could be accomplished in a
nondiscriminatory manner by conditioning acquisitions on a bank
holding company's total banking assets or total deposits rather than
specifically excluding those located outside of the designated re-
gions.55 Conditioning the acquisitions in this manner would pro-
mote the legitimate state purpose-avoiding economic
concentration-without "dividing the common market." 56 There-
fore, because the state interests promoted by regional banking laws
could be achieved in a less discriminatory way, regional banking
laws result in an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in
violation of the commerce clause. 57
III. The Douglas Amendment
The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate
commerce in a manner in which individual states may not.58 Con-
gress may indirectly exercise this power by authorizing the states to
regulate interstate commerce in a manner which would otherwise
violate the commerce clause if the states were to act without such
authorization. 59 Proponents of regional banking laws contend that
the Douglas Amendment 60 is such congressional authorization and
that therefore otherwise unconstitutional regional banking laws
pass constitutional muster.6 '
But the Supreme Court has stated that "for a state regulation
to be removed from the reach of the dormant commerce clause,
congressional intent must be unmistakably clear." 62 The policies
underlying the commerce clause require that Congress "affirma-
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. at 43. See also Bank of New England
Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 383 (1984).
55 See, e.g., 447 U.S. at 43. See also 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 383.
56 See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
57 See 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 383.
58 447 U.S. at 44.
59 Id. See also South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2240 (1984);
H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 542-43; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328
U.S. 408, 423-24 (1946); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945).
60 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
61 See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
62 South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2242.
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tively contemplate otherwise invalid state legislation." 6 3 Accord-
ingly, as a general proposition, most courts require at least an
"express statement of congressional policy prior to finding that
state regulation is permissible." 64 Neither the plain language of the
Douglas Amendment nor its legislative history indicates a congres-
sional intent to authorize the states to discriminate against inter-
state commerce.
A. The Plain Language of the Douglas Amendment
The plain language of the Douglas Amendment 65 prohibits the
Board from approving any application by a bank holding company
to acquire a bank located in another state unless the state in which
the bank is located has, by statute, specifically authorized acquisi-
tions. 66 The Douglas Amendment is simply a general grant of au-
thority to the Board to allow such interstate acquisitions. 67 The
amendment, however, does not "expressly state" 68 or "affirma-
tively contemplate" 69 that states may permit interstate acquisitions
in a manner which burdens interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court has recognized that:
63 Id.
64 Id. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex reL Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), the Court held a
Nebraska law which restricted the export of ground water unconstitutional as an impermis-
sible burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 958, 960. Despite 37 federal statutes and a
number of congressionally approved interstate compacts which indicated Congress' willing-
ness to defer to state legislatures, the Court did not find sufficient congressional authoriza-
tion for states to impose unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at 960. The
Court noted that where authorization to discriminate against interstate commerce has been
found, it has been "expressly stated." Id. (citing New England Power Co. v. New Hamp-
shire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982)) (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408,
427 (1946)).
Moreover, in New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982), the
Court held that a federal statute which left to the states regional authority over the export
of electricity did not constitute congressional authorization to the states to impose imper-
missible burdens on interstate commerce. Id. at 343. The Court noted that there was
"[n]othing in the legislative history or the language of the statute evinc[ing] a congressional
intent 'to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause.'" Id.
at 341 (quoting United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 304 (1953)).
Similarily, in Lew;s the Court held that § 7 of the BHCA, 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1982),
which reserved to the states residual authority over bank holding companies, was not an
affirmative grant of power by Congress for states to impermissibly burden interstate com-
merce. Id. at 49. See note 10 supra.
But see White v. Massachusetts Council of Const. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983)
(holding that regulations issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
which affirmatively permitted discrimination by states were sufficient authorization even
though the federal statutes did not specifically authorize such regulations).
65 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982); see note 13 supra.
66 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
67 See note 13 supra and accompanying text. See also Bank of New England Corp., 70
Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 384 (1984).
68 See note 64 supra.
69 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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The language of the statute [the Douglas Amendment] estab-
lishes a general federal prohibition on the acquisition or expan-
sion of banking subsidiaries across state lines. The only
authority granted to the States is the authority to create excep-
tions to this general prohibition, that is, to permit expansion of
banking across state lines where it otherwise would be federally
prohibited. 70
The Douglas Amendment speaks in terms of permitting states to cre-
ate exceptions to the general federal prohibition of interstate acqui-
sitions, but it does not "expressly authorize" 7' states to permit
exceptions in a manner which burdens interstate commerce.
Therefore, regional banking laws are consistent with the literal
terms of the Douglas Amendment insofar as they specifically authorize
interstate acquisitions. Regional banking laws are not consistent
with the commerce clause, however, because the laws authorize acqui-
sitions which burden interstate commerce. These violations cannot
be excused because the Douglas Amendment is not express con-
gressional authorization for states to allow acquisitions in a manner
which violates the commerce clause.72
B. The Legislative History of the Douglas Amendment
Since the Douglas Amendment does not, on its face, indicate a
congressional intent to authorize states to discriminate against in-
terstate commerce, congressional consent must be discerned from
the amendment's legislative history. Unfortunately, the Douglas
Amendment was proposed and adopted on the Senate floor.
Therefore, neither committee reports nor other significant legisla-
tive history sources are available to supplement congressional
debate. 73
During the Senate debate, Congress seemed more concerned
with the Douglas Amendment's prohibitory aspects, rather than
with the means which states might use to lift the federal ban on
interstate acquisitions. Accordingly, there was no discussion of the
70 Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. at 47 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
See notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text.
71 See note 64 supra.
72 This conclusion is consistent with the Board's finding in approving the application of
Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374 (1984). The Board stated:
[T]he Douglas Amendment does not appear on its face to authorize discrimination
by Connecticut in favor of its own residents and those of Massachusetts and other
New England states having reciprocal laws, but against all other states. The Doug-
las Amendment's general authorization to the Board of Governors to permit inter-
state acquisitions . . . [if authorized by state law] does not appear to meet the
stringent test of explicitness laid down by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 384 (emphasis in original).




states' ability to discriminate among out-of-state bank holding com-
panies.74 Senator Douglas stated that his amendment would "pre-
vent bank holding companies from expanding across State lines,
unless the States gave them explicit permission to do so." ' 75 The
aim of the amendment, Senator Douglas continued, was to "permit
out-of-State holding companies to acquire banks in other States
only to the degree that State laws expressly permit them." 76
Further, apart from the unforseeability of discriminatory legis-
lation, Congress likely did not contemplate that a state would enact
any legislation which would lift the federal ban on interstate acquisi-
tions. Senator Bricker, during the Senate debate, stated that the
amendment, in effect, "constitutes an absolute prohibition against
future expansion by bank holding companies." 77 In short, Congress
did not "affirmatively contemplate" 7 that the Douglas Amendment
was authorization for states to lift the federal ban on interstate ac-
quisitions in a manner which impermissibly burdens interstate
commerce.
The Board has argued 79 that several references during the Sen-
ate debate to states' rights indicate that Congress intended to grant
states plenary power in permitting entry by out-of-state bank hold-
ing companies. In discussing the scope of the Douglas Amend-
ment, Senator Douglas referred to the states' ability to allow entry
by out-of-state holding companies "only to the degree that State
laws expressly permit them."80 He further stated that "[a]nyone
who favors States rights, it seems to me should support my
amendment." 8 1
As noted, however, the Supreme Court requires an "express
statement" by Congress that it is authorizing states to discriminate
against interstate commerce.82 Given this high standard for speci-
ficity, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would find these frag-
mented references to states' rights to be the requisite congressional
74 See Iowa Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
("Not once in the entire debate [on the Douglas Amendment] is the discrimination ques-
tion raised.").
75 102 CONG. REC. at 6859 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
76 Id. at 6858 (statement of Sen. Douglas).
77 Id. at 6861 (statement of Sen. Bricker). Sen. Bricker reiterated his statement, saying
"the effect of the Douglas amendment is to absolutely prohibit a bank from crossing State
lines." Id. Sen. Douglas, earlier in the debate stated that "the immediate practical effect
would be to bar the expansion of bank holding companies across State lines." Id. at 6860
(statement of Sen. Douglas).
78 See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
79 See Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 385 (1984). See also Note,
supra note 32, at 2038 n.84.
80 102 CONG. REC. at 6858 (1956) (statement fo Sen. Douglas).
81 Id. at 6860.
82 See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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authorization for states to enact discriminatory regional banking
laws.8 3 The Court has stated that it has "no authority to rewrite
• . * legislation based on mere speculation as to what Congress
probably had in mind' "84 Thus, the Douglas Amendment, neither
on its face nor in its legislative history, authorizes states to enact
discriminatory regional banking laws.8 5 Accordingly, regional
banking laws are unconstitutional because they impose an imper-
missible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the com-
merce clause.
IV. Challenges to Regional Banking Laws: Northeast Bancorp, Inc.
v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
83 See 70 Fed. Res. Bull. at 385.
84 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982).
85 It has been urged that several references in the House Committee report and in the
Senate subcommittee hearings to "trade areas" is proof that Congress contemplated and,
through the BHCA, authorized states to enact regional banking statutes. The Committee
report accompanying the House version of the BHCA stated:
Repeatedly Congress has been urged to break down the restrictions in the national
banking law regarding branches of national banks. Congress has been urged to
permit branches, regardless of State bank laws, on a trade area basis, on an interstate
or Federal Reserve district basis, and in fact on a nationwide basis.
H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1955) (emphasis added).
Moreover, a witness before a Senate hearing on H.R. 6227 stated that "a trade area
approach such as a Federal Reserve district. could be defended quite logically whereas
state lines are historical accident. Massachusetts is a little State because it is an old State,
and why should that historical accident serve today to penalize them?" Control of Bank Hold-
ing Companies: Hearings on S. 880, S. 2350, and H.R. 6227 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 140 (1955) (statement ofJohn T. Noo-
nan, Counsel, Baystate Corp.) (emphasis added).
These references to the establishment of a trade area in banking do not demonstrate
that Congress was expressly authorizing regional banking laws. These references merely
indicate that Congress was aware of the possibility of regional banking laws. Persuasive
evidence of this is found in the fact that the Senate committee considered the Douglas
Amendment but voted against adding the amendment to the bill. See 102 CONG. REC. at
6862 (1956). Had the Committee decided to authorize regional banking laws through the
Douglas Amendment, they would have voted to include the Douglas Amendment in the bill
which they reported to the entire Senate. As noted, the bill was reported to the Senate
without the Douglas Amendment-the amendment was proposed on the Senate floor.
Additionally, the committees' references were not directed to the Douglas Amend-
ment. If the committees were intending to authorize regional banking laws, they had to be
doing so through a provision in the BHCA other than the Douglas Amendment. The only
other possible provision which was included in both the House bill and the Senate bill was
§ 7, 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1982), the non-preemption clause. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447
U.S. 27 (1980), interpreted § 7 of the BHCA to permit states to impose greater restrictions
upon bank holding companies than the BHCA requires, see note 10 supra, but § 7 was not
intended as authorization for states to impermissibly burden interstate commerce. 447 U.S.
at 48-49.
Thus, by passing the Douglas Amendment Congress did not intend to specifically au-
thorize states to enact discriminatory regional banking laws.
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System, 86 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the Connecticut and Massachusetts regional banking laws
did not violate the commerce clause, the compact clause, or the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.8 7 In
Northeast, three bank holding companies, two based in Massachu-
setts and one based in Connecticut, sought to acquire companies in
the opposite state.88 Before approving any applications, the Board
invited comment on each of the three applications.8 9 Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. ("Northeast") and Citicorp both filed objections. 90
Despite these objections, the Board approved all three applica-
tions.91 The Board found that the Connecticut and Massachusetts
regional banking statutes specifically authorized the acquisitions.
Therefore, the Board felt that the acquisitions were permitted by
the Douglas Amendment.9 2 The Board stated that "the Douglas
Amendment should be read as a renunciation of federal interest in
regulating the interstate acquisition of banks by bank holding com-
panies"9 3 and that there was no "clear and unequivocal" basis for
finding either statute unconstitutional. 94
Pursuant to section 9 of the BHCA,9 5 Citicorp and Northeast
appealed the Board's decision directly to the court of appeals.
First, the court concluded that the Douglas Amendment was spe-
cific authorization by Congress for states to enact regional banking
laws. 96 The court noted that the Douglas Amendment requires
states to specifically authorize interstate acquisitions before the
86 740 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985). This is the only
court challenge to regional banking laws to date. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Woolf, 576
F. Supp. 1225 (D. Conn. 1983), arfd mere., 742 F.2d 1439 (1984) (dismissing Northeast's
challenge to the Connecticut regional banking law because Northeast lacked standing).
87 740 F.2d at 210.
88 Id. at 204. Bank of New England Corporation ("BNE"), a Massachusetts bank hold-
ing company, sought Board approval to acquire CBT Corporation, a Connecticut bank
holding company, id. at 205; Hartford National Corporation ("HNC"), a Connecticut bank
holding company, sought Board approval to acquire Arltru Bankcorporation, a Massachu-
setts bank holding company, id. at 206; and Bank of Boston Corporation ("BBC"), a Massa-
chusetts bank holding company, sought Board approval to acquire Colonial Bancorp, Inc.,
a Connecticut bank holding company. Id. at 205-06.
89 Id. at 205.
90 Because of doubts concerning the constitutionality of regional banking laws, both
Northeast and Citicorp opposed the BNE application. Id. Citicorp also opposed the HNC
application and it filed comments with the Board concerning the BBC application. Id. at
206.
91 Id. at 205, 206. See also Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374 (1984);
Hartford Nat'l Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 353 (1984); Bank of Boston Corp., 70 Fed. Res.
Bull. 524 (1984).
92 740 F.2d at 205, 206.
93 Id. at 205. (citing the Board of Governors in approving all three applications).
94 Id. (citing the Board of Governors in approving all three applications).
95 12 U.S.C. § 1848 (1982).
96 740 F.2d at 208.
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Board may approve such acquisitions. 97 Accordingly, since the
Massachusetts and Connecticut laws were specific authorization for
other New England bank holding companies to acquire banks lo-
cated within Massachusetts and Connecticut, 98 the laws were au-
thorized by the Douglas Amendment. Furthermore, the court
determined that because absent these statutes, out-of-state bank
holding companies could not acquire Massachusetts or Connecticut
banks, the statutes promote interstate commerce rather than re-
strict it.99
Although the court correctly concluded that the Massachusetts
and Connecticut statutes specifically authorize interstate acquisi-
tions as required by the Douglas Amendment, the court failed to
recognize that even if the statutes promote interstate commerce,
they do so in a way which frustrates the purposes underlying the
commerce clause. 100 Moreover, the court failed to show that the
Douglas Amendment specifically authorizes (as the Supreme Court re-
quires) states to violate the commerce clause.
Second, the court held that the Douglas Amendment does not
support the argument that to avoid conflicting with federal law, the
Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes must permit all bank hold-
ing companies throughout the nation to acquire their banks, or they
may not permit any.'0 1 The Douglas Amendment probably does
not support such an argument. 10 2 But the Douglas Amendment
does not support the argument that states may permit acquisitions
of their banks by bank holding companies in other states pursuant
to discriminatory regional banking statutes. 10 3 As previously
noted, 104 a state could achieve those goals' 0 5 advanced by the re-
gional banking laws in other ways. For example, the state could
place limits on a bank holding company's total banking assets or
total deposits. 0 6 This is not an all or nothing approach and these
less discriminatory restrictions would not violate the commerce
clause.
In analyzing the legislative history of the Douglas Amendment,
the court referred to Senator Douglas' statement that the amend-
ment allows states to permit entry of out-of-state bank holding
97 Id. at 207.
98 Id. at 207-08.
99 Id. at 208.
100 See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
101 740 F.2d at 208.
102 See Iowa Indep. Bankers v. Board of Governors, 511 F.2d at 1296.
103 See notes 58-85 supra and accompanying text.
104 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
105 See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
106 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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companies. 0 7 Moreover, the court quoted Senator Douglas as say-
ing that the effect of the amendment would be to "bar the expan-
sion of bank holding companies across State lines. But the
amendment would leave the way open for States to make explicit
provisions for acquisitions if they so decided."' 08 The court recog-
nized that states must have clear congressional authorization before
enacting statutes which interfere with interstate commerce. Never-
theless, the court concluded that the Douglas Amendment author-
ized Massachusetts and Connecticut to enact regional banking
laws. 10 9 The court, however, failed to explain how the fragmented
quotations of Senator Douglas amounted to explicit authorization
for states to enact regional banking laws. 110 That Congress did not
contemplate the type of legislation states might enact to allow out-
of-state holding companies to acquire in-state banks, accompanied
by Senator Douglas' conclusory statements about the effect of the
Douglas Amendment, cannot be read as specific authorization for
states to enact regional banking laws. Therefore, based on an erro-
neous belief that the Douglas Amendment is congressional authori-
zation for states to enact regional banking laws, the court
concluded that the Connecticut and Massachusetts statutes did not
violate the commerce clause."'
V. Policy Considerations
In addition to this constitutional infirmity, regional banking
laws raise important public policy considerations which Congress
should carefully consider. Because of both its constitutional offen-
siveness and its unexplored policy implications, the Northeast case
should be reversed and regional banking laws therefore disallowed
until Congress expressly authorizes them.
One of the purposes of the BHCA was to control the future
expansion of bank holding companies."12 However, the Board has
noted that:
The regional interstate banking system developing in New Eng-
107 740 F.2d at 207.
108 Id. (quoting Sen. Douglas, 102 CONG. REC. at 6860).
109 Id. at 208.
110 See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
111 740 F.2d at 208. The court also found that regional banking laws do not violate the
compact clause, id. at 209, or the equal protection clause, id. at 209-10.
Moreover, perhaps realizing that the Douglas Amendment does not authorize regional
banking laws, U.S. Sen. Paul E. Tsongas and U.S. Rep. Barney Frank, both of Massachu-
setts, jointly sponsored a bill which would have authorized regional banking laws. S. Res.
2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Title X (1984). The bill passed the Senate, but not the House.
The fact that the bill was introduced might suggest that Congress doubts that the Douglas
Amendment is specific authorization of regional banking laws.
112 S. REP. No. 1095, supra note 9, at 1. See also 70 Stat. 133 (1956).
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land raises issues of considerable importance because no fewer
than 15 state legislatures are considering proposals that, if en-
acted, would create regional banking systems in every part of
the country. . . .Both the increasing number of states consid-
ering such proposals and the progress of the proposed legisla-
tion toward enactment suggest that, should the New England
interstate banking zone be upheld, a system of regional zones
may develop involving major areas of the nation. 11 3
Regional banking laws result in state control over the structure of
the nation's banking industry. By creating a regional structure, a
structure not contemplated by Congress in 1956, regional banking
laws defeat the purpose of the BHCA by removing the control of
bank holding companies from Congress and placing it with the
states.
Moreover, regional banking laws undermine the basic policies
established by the BHCA and could effectively destabilize the na-
tion's financial system."14 Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, stated that in addition to
other changes in the banking industry, regional banking laws "are
pushing beyond the basic policies established by the Congress in
setting out a broad distinction between banking and commerce."' 1 5
The policies of the BHCA "are now being undermined by a haphaz-
ard pattern of . . . interstate acquisitions ....*"116 In Volcker's
opinion, "the overriding public interest in a strong, stable, and
competitive financial system will be lost."' 1 7
VI. Conclusion
The banking industry is subject to dual federal and state regu-
lation. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 prohibits inter-
state acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies unless the
state specifically authorizes such acquisitions. At least sixteen states
have enacted regional banking laws authorizing, on a regional ba-
113 Bank of New England Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 374, 375-76 (1984).
114 Regional banking laws provide the "worst of both worlds." S. REP. No. 560, supra
note 36, at 103 (additional views of Senator Proxmire). On the one hand, the laws under-
mine the BHCA goal of providing for local control of banks, see note 9 supra, while, on the
other hand, they do not provide the benefits of unrestricted national competition. S. REP.
No. 560, supra note 36, at 103 (additional views of Senator Proxmire).
115 Statement by Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Mar. 27, 1984,
reprinted in 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 298, 308 (1984).
116 Id.
117 Id. Regional banking arrangements create a variety of advantages. For example,
regional banking arrangements could serve during a transitional period to phase-in inter-
state banking. See id. at 307. This decision, however, should be made by Congress. Leav-
ing the decision on regional banking laws to Congress would give Congress the opportunity
to forbid statutes like the Utah statute, see note 38 supra, and create regional arrangements
conforming to natural market areas.
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sis, interstate acquisitions. These laws place an impermissible bur-
den on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause.
Because the Douglas Amendment does not authorize such discrimi-
natory legislation, these regional banking laws are unconstitutional.
Further, Congress has never affirmatively considered either the
advantages or disadvantages inherent in regional banking laws. Re-
gional banking laws have the potential to restructure the nation's
financial system. The courts should not validate them until Con-
gress expressly approves of their use.
Robert H. Kurnick, Jr.
